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A NEG-CHICAGO PERSPECTIVE ON 
ANTITRUST INSTITUTIONS 
DANIEL A. CRANE* 
It has long been fashionable to categorize antitrust by its "schools." From 
the Sherman Act's passage to World War II, there were (at least) neo-classical 
marginalism, populism, progressivism, associationalism, business com-
monwealthism, and Brandeisianism. 1 From World War II to the present, we 
have seen (at least, and without counting the European Ordo-Liberals) Paleo-
Harvard structuralism, the Chicago School, Neo-Harvard institutionalism, and 
Post -Chicagoans. 2 
So why not Neo-Chicago? I am already on record as suggesting the possi-
ble emergence of such a school,3 so it is too late for me to dismiss the entire 
"schools" conversation as window-dressing. This Symposium is dedicated to 
defining and analyzing a "Neo-Chicago" School, so define and analyze we 
shall. 
My contribution is to offer several observations about the substantive un-
derpinnings of the Neo-Chicago School and then discuss at greater length how 
it can contribute to the debate about antitrust institutional structures. There are 
two reasons for this angle. 
First, institutional considerations and biases dominate antitrust policy and 
explain substantive antitrust rules in ways that the legal academy has too long 
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
1 See generally RuDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, CoMPETITION PoLicY IN AMERICA: 1888-1992 (1996); 
ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MoNOPOLY: A STUDY IN EcoNOMIC 
AMBIVALENCE 35-51 (1966); Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 
1890-1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311 (2009). 
2 See generally 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'j[ 112d (3d 
ed. 2006); Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme 
Court Decisions, 3 CoMPETITION PoL'Y INT'L 59, 59-60 (2007) [hereinafter Harvard, Not Chi-
cago]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago: A Review and Critique, 2001 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 
257; William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant 
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix , 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1. 
3 Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Cm. L. REv. 1911 
(2009) [hereinafter Chicago, Post-Chicago]. 
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neglected.4 If the Neo-Chicago School does not seriously grapple with institu-
tional issues, then it will fail to capture important contributions to the struc-
ture and orientation of modem antitrust law. 
Second, Neo-Chicago's two principal competitors at the moment are Post-
Chicago and Neo-Harvard. I will argue that Post-Chicago is still too diffuse 
and undetermined to qualify as a full-fledged "school," but as it forms more 
concretely it will provide a serious challenge to Chicago School (and, deriva-
tively, Neo-Chicago) ideas. Neo-Harvard-a highly influential modem 
schoolS-is defined primarily by its institutionalism and is less of a threat to 
core Chicago School ideas. Neo-Chicago needs to embrace Neo-Harvard's 
institutionalism-mutatis mutandis-if its proponents want to perpetuate the 
uneasy Chicago-Harvard alliance that has prevailed in the Supreme Court for 
the last two decades. 6 
This essay seeks to contextualize and define the Neo-Chicago School 
through an institutionalist lens. The Paleo-Chicago School failed to offer a 
thorough institutional assessment. I argue that to be relevant the Neo-Chicago 
School needs a positive institutional theory, as contrasted to the "pox on all of 
your houses" dismissiveness of Paleo-Chicago. I consider the institutional 
question in historical perspective by stylizing three dominant institutional 
models as personified by the three principal contenders in the 1912 Presiden-
tial election. With these three models as context, I offer some prescriptions for 
a Neo-Chicago institutionalist approach, which would center on a preference 
for executive-branch enforcement, administrative rather than adversarial deci-
sionmaking processes, and a continued strong judicial role in norm creation. 
I. WHAT IS THE NEO-CHICAGO SCHOOL? 
Intellectual "schools" tend to be "Protestant" rather than "Catholic," mean-
ing that there is no central creedal authority to delimit orthodoxy and heresy. 
It is difficult enough to draw the lines around the Chicago School, whose 
titans, such as Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, Aaron Director, and Robert 
Bork, are associated with the University of Chicago. By contrast, Neo-Chi-
cagoan antitrust analysis is not geographically centered at the University of 
Chicago, nor necessarily associated with household names in the legal acad-
emy. Further, since the school-if there be such a school-is still in its rela-
tive infancy, there is no fixed canon of work ready for compilation and 
attribution to the school. 
4 See generally DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT (2010) (hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE]. 
5 See Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago, supra note 2. 
6 See Daniel A. Crane, linkLine' s Institutional Suspicions, 2008-09 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 111 
[hereinafter Institutional Suspicions]. 
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Hence, defining the Neo-Chicago School requires more than identifying a 
cluster of ideologically similar intellectuals working on similar issues, using 
similar methods, and drawing upon a common intellectual infrastructure, such 
as a university, think tank, or academic network. It requires placing Neo-Chi-
cago within a sweep of antitrust intellectual history. 
The roots of the story go back to at least the 18th century,? but I pick up the 
story in the post-War era. During the 1950s and '60s, a structuralist "Harvard 
School" associated with Joe Bain, Carl Kaysen, and Donald Turner dominated 
U.S. antitrust thought.8 Harvard-or what I will later call Paleo-Harvard-
rested interventionist policy prescriptions on a deterministic structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm in which the structure of a market predetermined 
its competitive performance. 
During the 1970s and '80s, the Chicago School-or perhaps we should 
now call it the Paleo-Chicago School-scored a knockout punch against the 
Paleo-Harvard School by significantly discrediting its empirical assertions 
about the relationship between structure and performance and explaining that 
many practices once understood as anticompetitive were competitively 
benign. 
While Paleo-Chicago was making its inroads, the Harvard contingent un-
derwent an "unacknowledged conversion experience,"9 in which it abandoned 
its earlier interventionism without fully embracing the Chicago perspective. 
The emerging Neo-Harvard School, represented by the canonical Antitrust 
Law treatise and its principal custodians, Turner, Phillip Areeda, and now 
Herbert Hovenkamp, articulated a centrist or even conservative approach to 
antitrust law. Hovenkamp, the reigning dean of the Neo-Harvard School, 
writes that "[t]oday the Harvard School is modestly more interventionist than 
the Chicago School, but the main differences lie in details."10 
But the details are not unimportant. Paleo-Chicago and Neo-Harvard can be 
compared and contrasted on two important vectors of antitrust policy. First, 
Paleo-Chicago expresses a much stronger belief in the good functioning and 
self-correcting properties of the market than does Neo-Harvard. Second, while 
both Paleo-Chicago and Neo-Harvard mistrust antitrust's institutional appara-
tus-particularly private plaintiffs, juries, and treble damages-there are im-
7 See INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CoMPETITION POLICY: SELECTED READINGS (Daniel A. 
Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., forthcoming 2012) (tracing the roots of intellectual engage-
ment over competition policy and ideology in 18th-century thought). 
8 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94 MINN. 
L. REv. 311, 346-59 (2009). 
9 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION 37 
(2005). 
10 !d. at 38. 
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portant differences in their institutional prior beliefs. Neo-Harvard, best 
represented perhaps by Justice Stephen Breyer, prefers regulatory solutions to 
antitrust solutions and public enforcement to private enforcement. 11 In cases 
like Trinko, 12 linkLine, 13 NYNEX, 14 and Credit Suisse, 15 this led the Breyer 
wing of the Supreme Court to concur in the Chicago School's judgment that 
private antitrust liability should be disallowed. The Chicago School, by con-
trast, disfavors both regulatory interventions and antitrust interventions, and 
has no particular affinity for government suits over private suits. Hence, the 
story of antitrust on the Supreme Court over the last two decades-of defend-
ants' 15-0 rout of plaintiffs between 1993 and 201016-is best understood as 
the uneasy and sometimes begrudging alliance of Paleo-Chicago and Neo-
Harvard. 
As usual, the challenge to the dominant intellectual school began quietly 
while the incumbent was still ascendant. Already during the 1980s there was 
talk of a Post-Chicago School that would correct some of Chicago's over-
reaching.17 That Post-Chicago lacks the geographical identifier of its prede-
cessor "schools" reflects the fact that Post-Chicago may still be less of a 
discrete school than a collection of attacks on Chicago School tenets. Robert 
Pitofsky' s 2008 collection, How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, 18 is 
an attempt to corral leading Post-Chicago voices, but it fails to articulate a 
common theoretic or normative approach to antitrust law as a proposed suc-
cessor to Chicago.19 It is not primarily a call for more empiricism, a different 
theoretical approach (such as behavioralism or game theory), or a different 
normative understanding of antitrust. Rather, it consists of a succession of 
targeted criticisms of particular Chicago School arguments. 
At the present time, at least, Post-Chicago has hardly coalesced into a real 
school. The important work that has been done-for example, the Bolton, 
Brodley, and Riordan paper on predatory pricing20 and Einer Elhauge's paper 
11 Crane, Institutional Suspicions, supra note 6, at 1919-20. 
12 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
13 Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
14 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998). 
15 Credit Suisse Sees. (USA) LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
16 Crane, Institutional Suspicions, supra note 6, at 113. 
17 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 
(1985). 
1s How THE CHICAGO ScHOOL OvERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFEcT oF CoNSERVATIVE Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
19 Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, supra note 3, at 1928. 
2o Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Bradley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic 
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEo. L.J. 2239 (2000). 
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on tying, price discrimination, and bundled discounting21-are significant 
pieces standing alone but lack a sufficiently common approach and texture to 
permit the mapping of a new school. Also, it is possible that the "schools" 
categorization exercise has reached the limits of its utility when it comes to 
such fine questions as the difference between Post-Chicago and Neo-Harvard, 
which may tum out, with the benefit of historical hindsight, to overlap to the 
point of indistinction. 
This brings us to the emergent-or possibly emergent-Neo-Chicago 
School. As the foregoing historical narrative suggests, it is probably prema-
ture to say anything terribly concrete about the new school. If Post-Chicago 
has not yet sufficiently coalesced, that observation is even more true as to 
Neo-Chicago, which is in part a reaction to both Neo-Harvard and Post-Chi-
cago. Further, it is unclear to what extent Neo-Chicago differs that greatly 
from the Neo-Harvard of a Herbert Hovenkamp, for example. I have previ-
ously referred to Neo-Harvard as "Chicago-lite,"22 and it would not be unrea-
sonable to refer to Neo-Chicago also as Chicago-lite, although of a somewhat 
different flavor. 
Notwithstanding these equivocations, let me suggest four possible charac-
teristics of the emerging-or possibly emerging-Neo-Chicago School. First, 
the Neo-Chicago School is the current custodian of antitrust's "hospitability" 
tradition. Oliver Williamson once referred to an antitrust "inhospitability tra-
dition," roughly coincident with the Warren Court, which "attributed anticom-
petitive purpose and effect to novel or nontraditional modes of economic 
organization."23 This is a useful mnemonic device, since it captures the bal-
ance of hostile perspectives on such activities as mergers and dominant firm 
conduct. "Hospitability" equally well captures the balance of sympathetic per-
spectives, characteristic of all manifestations of the Chicago School, to unfet-
tered business freedom, including the freedom to merge vertically and 
horizontally and engage in aggressive conduct toward rivals. 
Second, while Neo-Chicago is closely aligned in substance with the Chi-
cago School, it is likely to be narrower, more cautious, and less categorical in 
21 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit 
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REv. 397 (2009). 
22 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1193, 1195 (2007) (book review). 
23 Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics: Introduction, 127 U. 
PA. L. REv. 918, 920 (1979); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restric-
tions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 959 
(1979) [hereinafter Vertical Market Restrictions]. Williamson attributed this tradition to Donald 
Turner, then-Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, who was quoted as stating: "I approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospita-
bly in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." Williamson, 
Vertical Market Restrictions, supra, at 959 (quoting N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, ANTITRUST LAw 
SYMPOSIUM 29 (1968) (remarks of Stanley Robinson)). 
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its hospitability than was its ancestor. Whereas Paleo-Chicago would claim 
that predatory pricing never or almost never happens,24 Neo-Chicago would 
likely acknowledge that predatory pricing might occasionally happen, but 
claim that the vast majority of predatory pricing cases (particularly by com-
petitors) are overstated. Whereas Paleo-Chicago would claim that tying could 
never result in monopoly leverage because of the one monopoly profit the-
ory,25 Neo-Chicago would acknowledge that the one monopoly profit theory is 
not an absolute bar to the profitability of leveraging, but also claim that lever-
aging is still not plausible much of the time that it is alleged. 
Third, to the extent that Neo-Chicago has-or will come to have-a com-
mon methodological approach, it is an insistence on evidence-based justifica-
tions for antitrust interventions. Empirical work is a key to the Neo-Chicago 
School's future success.26 But even beyond formal empirical work, Neo-Chi-
cago focuses on testing the veracity of propositions in real market contexts. 
An example is David Evans and Michael Salinger's work examining the vari-
ous examples of tying and bundling in competitive markets and showing that 
these marketing strategies are the products of market-specific scale econo-
mies.27 In a few years' time, empirical work on the effects of Leegin28 will 
doubtless have to become a top priority for all competing "schools." 
The final characteristic of the Neo-Chicago School, and the one that I will 
examine in the rest of this essay, is (or should be) a focus on institutionalism. 
In this, Neo-Chicago shares a great deal with the Neo-Harvard School which, 
as noted, is dominated by institutionalist concerns. The two schools share a 
common belief that given the institutional structures of U.S. antitrust law, 
courts and agencies should employ antitrust judiciously. Yet, to revert to 
Hovenkamp's observation, there are differences in the details, and they 
largely follow the lines of the Neo-Harvard!Paleo-Chicago divide. Neo-Chi-
cagoans have stronger prior beliefs in the robustness of markets and thus are 
quicker to abandon antitrust interventions because of institutional frailties. 
Further, Neo-Chicagoans distrust regulation as an alternative to antitrust much 
more than do the Neo-Harvardians, which shows up in different institutional-
ist prescriptions. 
24 Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 
264 (1981) (observing that theories about predatory pricing are so variegated "for the same rea-
son that 600 years ago there were a thousand positions on what dragons looked like"). 
25 See RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-75 (2d ed. 1993); WardS. Bowman, 
Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-23 (1957); Aaron 
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281, 
290-92 (1956). 
26 Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, supra note 3, at 1931-32. 
27 David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Com-
petitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2005). 
28 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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And how does Neo-Chicago differ from Paleo-Chicago on institutions? As 
we shall see, Paleo-Chicago was characterized by a disdain for antitrust insti-
tutions almost across the board. By contrast, to remain distinctive, and thus 
viable, in a world of rising Post-Chicago sentiment, Neo-Chicago needs to 
offer both negative and positive institutionalist judgments. It cannot dismiss 
antitrust's institutional apparatus as hopelessly broken, thus justifying non-
intervention as a default; otherwise it will have little, if anything, to separate it 
from Paleo-Chicago. It must offer a positive prescription for how the state can 
best intervene to correct competitive market failures. 
II. PALEO-CHICAGO ON INSTITUTIONS 
A focus on institutions was not a major part of the early Chicago School 
critique.29 It played very little role in either of the Chicago School's two de-
fining monographs-Bork's and Posner's books published in the mid-1970s. 
Bork's Antitrust Paradox30 has virtually nothing to say about the institutional 
structure of antitrust enforcement, focusing instead on the normative goals of 
antitrust law and efficiency explanations for various commercial practices. 
The 1976 version of Posner's Antitrust Law has a single chapter devoted to 
"The Problem of Enforcement," which Posner expanded modestly in the re-
vised 2001 edition.31 Relatively little of the chapter in the first edition deals 
with institutional structure issues. Most of it concerns remedies and procedu-
ral issues. The second edition contains an expanded section on institutional 
structure issues, but most of the new thoughts relate to problems of antitrust 
federalism and the perception that state attorneys general frustrate federal en-
forcement32-probably a reflection of Posner's frustration with the failed 
Microsoft mediation.33 Posner makes no attempt to offer an overall prescrip-
tion for an institutionalist approach to antitrust. Nor does one find anywhere 
in the Paleo-Chicago canon an effort to provide a comprehensive account of 
institutional arrangements. 
But although Paleo-Chicago has not offered a thoroughgoing institutionalist 
assessment, small glimpses of its background views on antitrust institutions 
29 By institutionalism, I mean, broadly speaking, the study of trans-substantive determinants-
the inputs into antitrust decisionmaking other than legal doctrines or economic policy 
frameworks. See CRANE, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at xii. 
3o BoRK, supra note 25. 
31 RICHARD A. PoSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d 
ed. 2001). 
32 PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw (2001), supra note 31, at 280-83. 
33 Posner was appointed as a mediator to try to settle the Microsoft case brought by the federal 
government and nineteen states. The mediation, which occurred after Judge Thomas Penfield 
Jackson issued his findings of fact but before he issued his conclusions of law, failed to generate 
a settlement. In press accounts, Posner blamed the state attorneys general for obstructing a medi-
ated resolution. See Ken Auletta, Final Offer: What Kept Microsoft from Settling Its Case?, NEw 
YORKER, Jan. 15, 2001, at 40. 
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emerge at various junctures. The resulting collage is an unsympathetic per-
spective on almost any of antitrust's major institutional components. 
A. THE AGENCIES 
Paleo-Chicago finds few kind words to say about the federal antitrust agen-
cies, although, if pressed, seems to give a nod to the Antitrust Division over 
the FTC. Posner, himself a product of the FTC, has long dismissed the FTC as 
having no comparative advantage over Article III courts. His 1969 article of-
fered a scathing rebuke of the FTC as incompetent, self-aggrandizing, and 
lacking any comparative advantage over generalist judges.34 Despite consid-
erable modernization and improvement at the FTC in subsequent decades, in 
the second edition of Antitrust Law, Posner continues to dismiss the FTC as 
unlikely to have any comparative advantage over courts: "[T]he FTC is the 
prototype of a specialized trade-regulation court, yet I have never heard any-
one argue that it has displayed superior expertise to the courts when it comes 
to deciding antitrust cases."35 Posner finds dual enforcement "peculiar" but 
"pretty harmless" overall since the agencies have found ways to divide re-
sponsibilities and some competition between government agencies may pro-
duce some "modest benefits."36 
Frank Easterbrook comes down even more harshly on the FTC. Surveying 
the allocation of decisional authority to the agencies through the lens of public 
choice theory, Easterbrook argues that given the FTC's hybrid structure and 
primary accountability to a Congressional committee chairman, it is more be-
holden to producer interests than to consumer interestsY By contrast, Easter-
brook argues, the Justice Department-a purely executive agency-has 
traditionally advanced the interests of consumers over those of producers. 38 
Hence, Easterbrook argues that "[m]odern public choice theory leads us to 
discard claims based on 'expertise' and 'vigor' so that we may see the real 
effect of 'independence.' "39 
Robert Bork and Ward Bowman offer equal-opportunity criticism of both 
the FTC and the DOJ' s Antitrust Division, observing that the agencies "pro-
34 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1969). 
35 Posner, ANTITRUST LAW (2001), supra note 31, at 280. 
36 ld. 
37 Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspec-
tive, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1341-42 (1994). Easterbrook relies on several sources to make 
tbis point. Malcolm B. Coate eta!., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 33 J.L. 
& EcoN. 463, 481-82 (1990); B. Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder 
Wealth, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 241,263-67 (1983); William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, The 
Positive Economics of Antitrust Policy: A Survey Article, 5 lNT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 39, 40-52 
(1985). 
38 Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 1341-42. 
39 Id. at 1341. 
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tectionist" polices had exposed them to ridicule: "Scolding the enforcement 
agencies ... is highly diverting sport at bar association meetings-a sort of 
sedentary version of bullbaiting suitable for middle-aged lawyers .... "40 
Bork and Bowman allow that Congress might be equally at fault for passing 
dumb laws like the Robinson-Patman Act,41 but this caveat seemed more de-
signed to spread blame than to rehabilitate the agencies. 
1. Judges and Juries 
Given its aversion to the technocratic FTC model, Chicago might have been 
expected to embrace the generalist Article III actors-judges in particular-as 
the proper repositories of antitrust decisionmaking. In fact, Paleo-Chicago has 
relatively sour things to say about the ability of judges and juries to decide 
antitrust cases. 
Reflecting his error/cost paradigm,42 Easterbook has taken the Chicago 
School's lead in questioning the competence of judges and juries. Indeed, 
Easterbrook takes the general incompetence of judges and juries to decide 
complex antitrust issues as a reason to limit antitrust altogether: 
So we do not trust judges to make business decisions in corporate law. Yet 
antitrust law now calls for the same sorts of economic judgments. We ought 
to be skeptical of judges' and juries' ability to give good answers. And this 
implies being skeptical of antitrust itself, beyond some simple rules such as 
do not collude.43 
Posner, like Easterbrook, has questioned the ability of antitrust juries to sort 
out complex economic cases.44 Posner, however, has also dismissed proposals 
for specialized courts, including in antitrust.45 Just as Chicago dismissed 
claims about the superiority of "expert" agencies, it also dismissed claims 
about the superiority of "expert" courts. 
2. Private Enforcement 
For the Chicago School, most of the fine questions about private enforce-
ment-for example, whether indirect purchasers should have a right to re-
cover for overcharges-are simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. 
The right question is whether there should be private antitrust enforcement at 
40 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 
375 (1965). 
41 !d. 
42 Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984). 
43 Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
Pun. PoL'Y 5, 6 (1999). 
44 PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001), supra note 31, at 285. 
45 !d. at 280; RICHARD A. PosNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS, ch. 8 (1996). 
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all, and the answer seems to come out somewhere between no and probably 
not. 
Thus, for example, Easterbrook describes some forms of antitrust litigation, 
including private cases, as "an exercise in rent-seeking [that] is directed 
against practices that raise output and lower prices."46 Posner expresses con-
siderable skepticism about private antitrust enforcers, noting that "[s]tudents 
of the antitrust laws have been appalled by the wild and woolly antitrust suits 
that the private bar has brought-and won."47 He ultimately comes out as 
agnostic on whether eliminating the private right of action would be a good 
idea.48 In the second edition of his antitrust book, however, Posner proposes 
that the enforcement agencies be given a right of first refusal to bring dam-
ages actions, which would preempt the right of private litigants and state at-
torneys general. 49 
3. State Enforcers 
As noted at the outset of this section, the Chicago School has been particu-
larly critical of state attorneys general. Posner blames the state attorneys gen-
eral for obstructing a mediated resolution of Microsoft50 and subsequently 
argued that states should be "stripped of their authority to bring antitrust suits, 
federal or state, except under circumstances in which a private firm would be 
able to sue."51 Alternatively, he has proposed giving federal authorities a right 
of first refusal to bring antitrust cases and strip states and private parties from 
suing over the same matter.52 Without mentioning Microsoft specifically, he 
has developed a theory that state attorneys general follow a "strategy con-
sist[ing] of bringing high-profile lawsuits that attract publicity to the attorney 
general and promote the interests of politically influential state residents ... at 
the expense of nonresidents."53 
In a more recent empirical study drawing on Posner's data, Michael Greve 
finds evidence of parochialism in state attorney general antitrust enforcement, 
but not because of overenforcement against out-of-state interests.54 Greve 
46 Frank H. Easterbrook, When Does Competition Improve Regulation?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1297, 
1306 (2003). 
47 PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw (2001), supra note 31, at 275. 
48 !d. at 276. 
49 !d. at 282. 
50 See Auletta, supra note 33, at 40. 
51 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001). 
52 !d. at 941. 
53 Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys 
General, in CoMPETITION LAws IN CoNFLICT: ANTITRUST JuRISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL EcoN-
OMY 252, 257 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). 
54 Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 
72 U. Cm. L. REv. 99 (2005). 
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finds that states almost never challenge their sister states' anticompetitive con-
duct and have "consistently advocated a partial surrender of state regulatory 
autonomy."55 Picking up on similar themes, Easterbrook has noted that state 
attorneys general from the states in which Microsoft's competitors were head-
quartered were some of the prime movers in the Microsoft litigation, and re-
ferred to this diffusion of enforcement power as resulting in "competition to 
impose costs on citizens of other states."56 
In sum, there are few positive evaluations of any key institutional aspect of 
U.S. antitrust enforcement in the Paleo-Chicago canon. The overall view 
seems to be that the antitrust system is ill-equipped to enforce antitrust law-a 
view that leads to certain obvious conclusions about how much antitrust en-
forcement is socially optimal. 
III. NEG-CHICAGO'S CHOICES 
The preceding collage of Paleo-Chicago perspectives on antitrust institu-
tions points to a stark choice between antitrust minimalism and antitrust abdi-
cation. If, per the Paleo-Chicago School, the FTC has been alternately a 
sleepy backwater of incompetence or a protector of inefficient producers at 
the expense of consumers, if the Antitrust Division has been a laughingstock 
of middle-aged lawyers at bar association meetings, if Article III judges have 
been unable to keep up with antitrust's specialized and technical economic 
character, if juries are powder kegs of populism waiting to explode, if private 
litigants are ill-motivated rent seekers wielding a treble damages cudgel, and 
if state attorneys general are political actors waiting to exploit non-constitu-
ents in other states, then perhaps we should simply repeal the antitrust laws. 
But, for better or for worse, Neo-Chicago does not have the luxury of tak-
ing that position. The current, and probably durable, alignment of political 
wills in the courts, Congress, and the antitrust agencies suggests that antitrust 
will persist, and with some force. To remain relevant, any school must speak 
not only to what antitrust should not do but also to what it should do. And, 
just as important as what it should do is how it should do it. 
A. MoviNG BEYOND "A Pox ON ALL INsTITUTIONs" 
Neo-Chicago does not have the luxury of attacking every possible institu-
tional player in the antitrust system as incompetent and calling for a conse-
quent moratorium on antitrust enforcement. Antitrust abolition is not in the 
cards. Despite Chicago's substantial inroads in curtailing antitrust liability 
norms between the mid-1970s and the present, antitrust remains a potent legal 
55 ld. at 101. 
56 Easterbrook, When Does Competition Improve Regulation?, supra note 46, at 1306. 
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and regulatory instrument. Even the generally Chicago School Supreme Court 
has limited antitrust liability rather than abolish it in key areas such as tying,57 
predatory pricing,58 refusals to deal,59 and vertical intra-brand restraints. 60 The 
lower courts, the final word on most antitrust cases, have begun to show signs 
of restlessness with the prevailing Chicago sentiment. 61 Further, the mood of 
the legal academy, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and state attorneys gen-
eral, has swung in a more pro-enforcement direction. With a thousand new 
treble damages actions filed annually in the federal courts alone,62 a majority 
of states having repealed Illinois Bric/{63 in whole or in part under state anti-
trust laws,64 cartel fines and imprisonment reaching record levels,65 and new 
antitrust regimes taking off around the world,66 antitrust enforcement seems to 
be here to stay for the foreseeable future. Although the long-run effects of the 
"Great Recession" on regulatory politics remain to be seen, it seems likely 
that laissez-faire, anti-regulatory ideologies will face increasing pressure in 
coming years. 
At the same time that antitrust appears to be rebounding, institutional struc-
ture and dynamics are in vogue. For example, the FTC has recently begun to 
reassert its unique institutional position, calling for a reinvigorated reading of 
Section 5 of the FTC Act in order to unleash the FTC from the baggage of 
private litigation.67 The Antitrust Modernization Commission devoted sub-
57 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
58 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
59 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
60 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
61 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005) (permitting 
predatory pricing claim to be submitted to jury); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F. 3d 1109, 
1115 (lOth Cir. 2003) (observing that, in light of Post-Chicago scholarship, the court would not 
approach predatory pricing claims "with the incredulity that once prevailed"); LePage's Inc. v. 
3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane) (asserting the importance of monopolization law and 
rejecting predatory pricing analogies for bundled discounting claims). 
62 CRANE, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 55. 
63 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect purchasers may not 
bring a private treble damages action under federal antitrust law). 
64 CRANE, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 156. 
65 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Criminal Enforcement Fine and Jail Charts for 
Fiscal Years 2000-2010 (showing annual fine and imprisonment levels for preceding decade and 
comparing to averages for the 1990s), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/264101.html. 
66CRANE, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 211-14. 
67 See, e.g., Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, Intel 
Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (explaining importance of an independent Section 
5 of the FTC Act in light of contraction of Section 2 of the Sherman Act norms due to judicial 
concerns about private litigation), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intel 
statement. pdf. 
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stantial energy to institutional assessments, and made important recommenda-
tions, particularly on the federalism front. 68 
Perhaps most significantly, the Neo-Harvard School is making its most im-
portant moves on the institutional front. Take, for example, the statements in 
Justice Breyer's linkLine concurrence that price squeeze claims find a natural 
home in government (but not private) enforcement actions,69 his NYNEX opin-
ion worrying about transforming routine business torts into treble damages 
actions,70 his Leegin dissent that transitioning from the per se rule to the rule 
of reason puts too much pressure on judges and juries,71 his California Dental 
dissent that the FTC should be accorded deference in identifying what is and 
is not misleading advertising,72 his Credit Suisse opinion finding antitrust law 
preempted because of the SEC's superior regulatory competence,73 or the por-
tions of Trinka presumably inserted to attract Justice Breyer's vote about the 
regulatory presence of the FCC cutting against creating a duty to deal.74 Anti-
trust institutionalism has played a significant role in antitrust's development 
over the last two decades. It is likely to play an even larger role in the future, 
as institutional theories are more widely discussed and generalized. 
Neo-Chicago cannot afford to miss the institutionalist conversation, nor to 
enter it only to find fault with all of the institutions. To remain relevant and 
successful in an increasingly difficult post-Great Recession environment, 
Neo-Chicago needs to articulate an affirmative perspective on institutions: 
Which institutional arrangements work best? Which institutional adjustments 
68 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, ch. li (2007), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. 
69 Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 458 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the result) ("A 'price squeeze' claim finds its natural home in a Sherman Act § 2 
monopolization case where the Government as plaintiff seeks to show that a defendant's monop-
oly power rests, not upon 'skill, foresight, and industry,' but upon exclusionary conduct .... " 
(citations omitted)). 
70 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998) (worrying that overapplication 
of Sherman Act "would transform cases involving business behavior that is improper for various 
reasons, say, cases involving nepotism or personal pique, into treble-damages antitrust cases"). 
71 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914-15 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) ("But antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate economists' (some-
times conflicting) views. That is because law, unlike economics, is an administrative system the 
effects of which depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by 
judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their clients."). 
72 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 787 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Commis-
sion, which is expert in the area of false and misleading advertising, was uncertain whether [the 
association defendant] had even made the claim."). 
73 Credit Suisse Sees. (USA) LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (holding that initial public 
offering "laddering" practices were not antitrust violations because of SEC's regulatory jurisdic-
tion over such practices). 
74 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,411-15 
(2004) (examining presence of FCC regulatory authority as further reason not to impose a duty to 
deal under Section 2 of Sherman Act). 
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are best suited to maintaining a lightly but competently interventionist state 
hand? Which institutional arrangements provide the best complements to fa-
vored substantive rules-to the hospitability tradition? If it does not sincerely 
and persuasively answer these sorts of questions, Neo-Chicago will fail to 
establish itself as a viable and effective school. 
B. PARADIGMS FROM THE 1912 ELECTION 
Given the broad parameters of American law and politics, institutional 
choices for antitrust enforcement tum on several overlapping vectors, includ-
ing: (a) courts or agencies as principal norm creators; (b) public enforcement 
within the executive branch or an independent agency; (c) adjudication, regu-
lation, or administration; and (d) expert or generalist decisionmaking. There is 
no better way to understand these conflicting and competing policy vectors 
than by examining the positions on competition and antitrust enforcement ad-
vanced during the momentous three-way presidential race of 1912 between 
Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and William Howard Taft.75 Each candi-
date advanced a comprehensive perspective on the key themes bearing on the 
institutional structure of U.S. competition policy. Their three perspectives 
remain the best exemplars of the institutional positions that have competed 
over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries and hence provide a menu 
of discrete options for the Neo-Chicago School. 
Despite wearing the moniker "trustbuster," Roosevelt was far less inter-
ested than Taft and Wilson in restoring a competitive equilibrium to the mar-
ket. Roosevelt saw the large industrial trust as a necessary step in industrial 
progress. In private correspondence, he opposed the Standard Oil break-up, 
noting: "I do not myself see what good can come from dissolving the Stan-
dard Oil Company into forty separate companies, all of which will still remain 
really under the same control. What we should have is a much stricter govern-
mental supervision of these great companies .... "76 For Roosevelt, the im-
perative was not to break up large trusts or restore competition, but to bring 
the large trusts under the control of the government (an objective that forced 
him constantly to dodge accusations of socialism).77 Roosevelt viewed the 
courts as largely incapable of performing the necessary task of bringing the 
trusts under the thumb of the market and administering markets in an orderly 
fashion. He supported the creation of a strong administrative agency to con-
trol, regulate, and manage the trusts. 78 Roosevelt's institutionalist views thus 
75 MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CoRPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 
1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND PoLITICS (1988). 
76Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur B. Farquhar (Aug. 11, 1911), in THEODORE 
RoOSEVELT: LETTERS AND SPEECHES 652, 652 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004). 
77 SKLAR, supra note 75, at 341. 
78 /d. at 343-45. 
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translate into weak courts and a strong bureaucratic and administrative appa-
ratus to control and regulate large aggregations of capital. 
Wilson, regarded as a progressive, was considerably less progressive than 
Roosevelt on matters of institutional structure, in the sense that Wilson fa-
vored a weaker role for agencies and a stronger role for courts. As Marvin 
Sklar has written, "Wilson's position . . . may be regarded as a synthesis of 
Roosevelt's and Taft's: the establishment of a federal administrative commis-
sion charged with policing the market against unfair business methods, but 
limited in its powers by statute and judicial review .... "79 Wilson and his 
antitrust brain trust, Louis Brandeis, favored agency technocratic expertise 
over generalist decisionmaking in the executive branch, and to some extent 
administrative adjudication over judicial adjudication, but they did not go 
nearly as far as Roosevelt in abandoning the federal courts and consolidating 
regulatory power in a federal agency. Wilson explained that he did not "want 
a smug lot of experts to sit down behind closed doors in Washington and play 
providence to me."80 Wilson's institutionalist views thus translate into a bal-
ance of power between technocratic agencies and courts. 
At the far end of the spectrum, Taft concurred in the need for a vigorous 
antitrust policy, but expressed a far more conservative perspective on the 
manner of governmental interventions. Taft became increasingly suspicious of 
the "administrative methods of regulation," including license registration pro-
posals for large corporations, displacing state incorporation law with federal 
incorporation schemes for large trusts, and the establishment of a trade com-
mission.81 Taft, a former and future federal judge (and, as a candidate in 
1912, one who wanted nothing better than a seat on the Supreme Court), 
viewed the courts as the proper locus of antitrust decisionmaking, trusting 
them to safeguard property rights, announce incremental and adaptive solu-
tions to the trust problem, and manage the conflicting interests of various 
stakeholders in the world of government, politics, and business. 82 Thus, for 
example, during his presidency Taft downgraded the role of the Bureau of 
Corporations and reinvigorated the role of the Justice Department.83 Taft thus 
equates to an affinity for strong courts, a strong but judicially bounded law-
enforcing executive, and little use for technocratic administrative agencies. 
Of these three positions, Taft's pro-judicialism and his belief that courts 
should affirmatively consider the protection of property interests as an inde-
79 !d. at 420. 
80 Woodrow Wilson, A Campaign Address in Sioux City, Iowa, in 25 THE PAPERS OF WooD-
Row WILSON 148, 154 (ArthurS. Linked., 1978). 
81 SKLAR, supra note 75, at 367. 
82 !d. at 365-66. 
83 !d. at 369-70. 
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pendent policy objective when deciding antitrust cases should find the easiest 
sympathy of Neo-Chicagoans. After all, since the 1970s, the federal courts 
have been the most Chicago-friendly of institutions, rolling back the excesses 
of the Warren and early Burger Courts and expressing empathy for efficiency 
arguments. Further, Taft's affinity for executive branch over administrative 
agency enforcement and his coolness toward technocratic expertise are conso-
nant with Paleo-Chicago's hostility to the FTC and (mild) preference for the 
Antitrust Division. 
But Neo-Chicagoans face considerable difficulties in embracing Taft as 
their unqualified institutionalist champion. Most importantly, the competing 
perspectives in 1912 were focused on the government as antitrust enforcer-
not on the role of private treble damages litigation. Today, there are ten pri-
vate cases for every government case. 84 In the last two decades, only one 
public antitrust case (California Dental) has reached the Supreme Court. Pri-
vate litigation-and all of its baggage-has largely driven the creation of sub-
stantive antitrust norms over the last three decades. 
The predominance of private litigation suggests that Neo-Chicago should 
be chary of embracing an undifferentiated "courts and rule of law" approach 
to antitrust enforcement. In a world dominated by private litigation, "courts 
and rule of law" can easily come to mean competitor plaintiffs, customer class 
actions, treble damages, unilateral attorney-fee shifting, and juries as ultimate 
decisionmakers. This reality is markedly different from the "admirable adapt-
ability of decrees in equity" envisioned by Taft. 85 
Neo-Chicago's embrace of "courts and law" needs to be qualified as a pref-
erence for executive enforcement in the courts and hence public, rather than 
private, law. But this refinement opens difficult implementation issues in the 
current legal, regulatory, and political context. Short of scrapping antitrust's 
institutional framework and starting from scratch, Neo-Chicago needs to artic-
ulate a comprehensive institutional framework incorporating, but rebalancing, 
the existing actors. In the final section, I suggest a Neo-Chicago institutional 
framework, focused on executive enforcement, technocratic administration, 
and a strong continued role for the federal courts. 
C. NEo-CHICAoo's INSTITUTIONAL ATTACHMENTs: ExECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY, TECHNOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION, AND CoURTS 
Neo-Chicago's institutionalism will likely be Taftian, preferring judicial 
checks on agency overreaching, continued development of antitrust common 
law in the courts as opposed to ex ante regulation, and reluctance to delegate 
84 CRANE, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 163. 
85 WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST AcT AND THE SUPREME COURT 113-25 (1914). 
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excessive powers to the "headless 'fourth branch' of the Government."86 Yet 
this broad Taftian paradigm will need to take into account the institutional 
realities of contemporary antitrust enforcement, including the predominance 
of private litigation and its spillover effects on all of antitrust enforcement, the 
increasingly complex economic character of antitrust decisionmaking, and the 
success of hybrid institutional features developed over time, such as the quasi-
administrative merger control process instituted by the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act. Consistent with both the principles and the realities, I propose three 
broad principles for Neo-Chicagoan institutionalism: (1) executive authority; 
(2) technocratic administration; and (3) judicial supremacy. 
1. Executive Authority 
In this context, "executive authority" entails at least three separate ideas. 
The first is that public enforcement should predominate over private enforce-
ment. The second is that the executive branch of government, the Justice De-
partment's Antitrust Division, should not be marginalized as compared to the 
FTC, which is an independent agency not located within the executive branch 
and not directly accountable to the President. 87 The third is that the executive 
branch of government should have some discretionary space within which to 
form antitrust policy and resolve competition issues. 
I will defer consideration of the third idea until the following discussions on 
administrative solutions and courts and focus now on the first two ideas con-
cerning the position of the Antitrust Division compared to private enforcers 
and the FTC. Presently, private enforcement is by far the greater threat to 
Neo-Chicago ideals than the constitutionally suspect FTC. For the last several 
decades, the FTC has been relatively tame in its antitrust actions, whereas 
private enforcers have driven most of the controversial theories of liability, 
such as bundled discounting, refusals to deal, prize squeezes, predatory 
overbidding, predatory pricing, vertical intrabrand restraints, and all of the 
Robinson-Patman Act cases. With a few exceptions, the cease and desist rem-
edies sought and obtained by the FTC have been mild compared to the gar-
gantuan treble damages awards and privately negotiated settlements obtained 
by the private bar, negotiating in the shadow of the jury. 
The comparison between the FTC and private enforcement is relevant be-
cause one of the currently discussed policy levers for rebalancing the relative 
strength of public and private enforcement involves according the FTC an 
86 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40 (1937). 
87 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that the President may 
only remove FfC Commissioners for cause). 
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enhanced position under Section 5's "unfair methods of competition" prong.88 
Given the choice between a strong FTC and contained private bar and a 
neutered FTC and empowered private bar, Neo-Chicago' s preference should 
be clear. Given the present balance of influence, at least, it would be far pref-
erable for antitrust capital to flow to the FTC than to private enforcers. 
But recapitalizing the FTC by building up an independent Section 5 has 
negative consequences for another Neo-Chicago value since it involves ac-
cording the FTC a statutory advantage not enjoyed by the Antitrust Division, 
and hence building up the independent administrative agency at the compara-
tive expense of the executive agency. The same is true of according the FTC a 
53(b) advantage in merger preliminary injunction proceedings.89 While there 
may be sound arguments for giving the government (generically) an advan-
tage over private litigants in merger proceedings, it should be of concern to 
the Neo-Chicago School that the FTC has greater advantages in court than 
does the Antitrust Division.90 
The upshot is that one aspect of Neo-Chicago's affirmative institutional 
vision should be to articulate ways in which public enforcement can be re-
vived at the expense of private litigation, without having the side effect of 
promoting the FTC over the Antitrust Division. This essay is about broad 
themes rather than implementation details, so I will not attempt to sketch out 
the argument further here, except to say that statutory solutions may or may 
not be required. Some fairly strong recalibrations-such as giving the Justice 
Department a preemptive right over private litigation or state enforcement-
would require Congressional action. On the other hand, there are enough hints 
of willingness in the Harvard School to treat the Antitrust Division differently 
than private litigants-think Justice Breyer's elliptical statement in 
linkLine91-that Neo-Chicago may find some well-placed allies to advance 
portions of this project in the courts without legislative action. 
2. Technocratic Administration 
Both Taft and his Paleo-Chicago successors expressed discomfort with an 
administrative institutional structure for antitrust law. It is unsurprising that 
conservative, market-oriented antitrust schools would look suspiciously on 
technocratic ideals, given that the technocratic ideology that prevailed from 
88 See Daniel Crane, Thoughts on Section 5 of the FTC Act and the Case Against Intel, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Winter 2010 Vol. 2, No. 2 [hereinafter Intel]. 
89 See FI'C v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining 
that when the FI'C seeks an injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), it need not satisfy the traditional 
four-part equitable test for securing a preliminary injunction). 
90 One area where the Antitrust Division operates largely free from competition from the FI'C 
or private litigants is criminal anti-cartel enforcement, a subject I do not consider here. 
91 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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the Progressive Era to the New Deal was strongly anti-market and pro-central 
planning.92 However, there is nothing inherently interventionist about a "tech-
nocratic" or "administrative" approach to antitrust enforcement, if by that we 
mean only a preference for decisionmaking by experts rather than generalists 
and for problem-solving approaches to competition problems rather than ad-
versariallitigation. Indeed, in many other regulatory contexts, modern techno-
crats tend to be conservative, insofar as they call for "objective" or 
"scientific" approaches to risk management because of a perception that popu-
list decisionmakers tend to overestimate risks and hence prohibit efficient 
behavior.93 
Further, a preference for expert administration over adversarial adjudication 
does not have to entail an affinity for the FTC or, more generally, an indepen-
dent commission model. The Antitrust Division has as much "expertise" and 
technocratic capacity as the FTC,94 and may serve as well in a technocratic-
administrative capacity. 
The best example of a successful technocratic-administrative model in U.S. 
law is merger review under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.95 Whereas merger 
cases used to be litigated in courtrooms post-merger before randomly drawn 
Article III judges, most modern merger practice unfolds as premerger infor-
mation disclosure to the agencies and negotiation over divestiture packages or 
conduct remedies in borderline cases.96 This sort of administration is unam-
biguously superior to the prior adjudicatory model, but it also should not be 
confused with a top-down bureaucratic regulatory model. Decisionmaking is 
largely informal, expert, ad hoc, individually tailored, and negotiated. 
As I have explored more fully elsewhere, there are also available models of 
private technocratic administration to solve market power problems, such as 
the use of RAND commitments for standard-setting organizations and patent 
pools.97 Technocratic administration is characterized by expert problem-solv-
ing of competition issues, but the technocrats need not be government actors 
or central planners. The technocratic mode is fully consistent with market-
oriented values. 
92 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Technocracy]. 
93 !d. 
94 See generally CRANE, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 4, ch. 2. 
95 !d. at 93-94. 
96 !d. 
97 Daniel A. Crane, Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Dis-
crimination, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 371 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010). 
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Neo-Chicago should find technocratic administration appealing in many 
contexts. It avoids many of the institutional features that Neo-Chicagoans find 
most alarming, such as command-and-control regulation, populist and incom-
petent juries, and ill-motivated private plaintiffs wielding the treble damages 
cudgel. 
3. Judicial Supremacy 
The third prong of Neo-Chicagoan institutionalism-judicial supremacy-
need not be understood to stand in contradiction to the two earlier prongs-
executive authority and technocratic administration. Rather, the belief in judi-
cial supremacy articulates two important preferences as to the continued de-
velopment of antitrust norms: first, that courts continue to serve as a backstop 
to executive and administrative processes; and second, that Congress allow 
courts to continue to develop substantive norms in a common law fashion 
rather than attempt to specify substantive norms legislatively. 
a. Courts and Agencies 
In contrast to Roosevelt's view that courts had little useful role to play in 
controlling market power, both Taft and Wilson viewed the courts as essential 
players in demarcating the boundaries of antitrust law and limiting administra-
tive and executive discretion. For Neo-Chicagoans, the question is not 
whether the courts should play a role in shaping competition norms, but how 
much of a role courts should play, given the goal of resolving as many anti-
trust problems as possible employing a non-adjudicative, administrative mo-
dality. Obviously, if the parties are able to reach resolution of the competition 
issue by negotiating within the administrative process-as is true in most 
merger cases-there is no need for a judicial function, except to the extent 
that the parties' agreement needs to be embodied in a consent decree, where 
the role of the court, beyond the Tunney Act review phase, is usually nominal. 
The hard questions arise when the administrative negotiation breaks down, the 
agency reaches a decision contrary to the defendant's interests, and the courts 
are called upon to decide whether (1) in an FTC administrative case, the 
agency's decision was lawful, or (2) in an FTC litigated case or DOJ case, the 
agency has established antitrust liability. 
In such cases, the courts must fulfill their ultimate function "to say what the 
law is."98 But to what extent, if any, should the courts defer to the agencies' 
articulation of antitrust norms? This is technically a question of Chevron def-
98 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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erence,99 although the courts have not articulated it that way in the antitrust 
space. Under existing law, the federal courts of appeal are to review FTC 
decisions on matters of law de novo, although they also pay lip service to 
"afford[ing] the FTC some deference as to its informed judgment that a partic-
ular commercial practice violates the FTC Act."100 The DOJ's Antitrust Divi-
sion can enforce the antitrust laws only as a litigant, and is not formally 
accorded any prophylactic role in shaping the content of antitrust law. 
It would not be inconsistent with judicial supremacy for the courts to ac-
cord the agencies some degree of respect when the agencies propose new 
norms of antitrust liability, so long as the new norms are supported by a suffi-
cient record of deliberation, fit within the broad boundaries of the antitrust 
statutes' mandate, allow for judicial review under the norms' own terms, and 
do not pose an unacceptable risk of private litigation contagion. I will discuss 
briefly each of these criteria. 
First, when the agencies propose new liability norms, the courts should de-
fer only if there is sufficient evidence that the new norms grew out of a delib-
erative process in the agencies and were not merely made up on the fly to 
patch over factual weaknesses in the agencies' cases. Evidence of policy 
workshops, guidelines proposed for public comment, the collection of schol-
arly papers or empirical data, and similar indicia of systematic contemplation 
of the problem should support agency proposals for new liability or remedial 
norms. 
Second, the norms proposed by the agencies should be accorded respect 
only if they fit within the broad ambit of the antitrust statutes. That is to say, 
courts should always require that the agencies' theory concerns impediments 
to the functioning of competitive markets and problems of market power. The 
agencies should not be permitted to aggrandize their powers beyond the com-
petition mandate by claiming prophylactic space to solve problems adjacent 
to-but not of -competition. 
Third, the agencies' proposed liability determinants must be ones that the 
courts can administer. In other words, the courts should not let the agencies 
get away with claiming prophylactic space to decide issues without criteria for 
judicial review. I have previously observed that this was an arguable problem 
with the FTC's theory of Section 5 in the Intel case-the FTC articulated 
many reasons why it should be free from the strictures of the Sherman Act but 
failed to articulate criteria by which the courts could review its Section 5 
99 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (estab-
lishing modem doctrine of judicial deference to statutory interpretation by administrative agen-
cies); see also Crane, Technocracy, supra note 92, at 1206-08. 
100 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1063 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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decisions. 101 Without justiciable criteria, the agencies' plea for "space" is a 
plea to be free from the courts and "the rule of law." 
Finally, the courts should be most willing to accord the agencies deference 
on new liability theories when those theories can be administered solely 
within the realm of government enforcement and not spill over to private liti-
gation. For the FTC suing under Section 5, this is straightforward, since there 
is no private right of action to enforce the FTC Act. 102 As previously noted, it 
is much more challenging for the Antitrust Division. 
According some degree of deference to the agencies under these circum-
stances would not entail abdicating the judiciary's ultimate authority to deter-
mine legal norms. Rather, it would strengthen the engagement between the 
courts and the agencies by providing a roadmap for a judicially supervised 
agency role in creating and revising antitrust norms. 
b. Courts and Congress 
The second major aspect of judicial supremacy is a preference that Con-
gress respect the success that the courts have enjoyed in developing an anti-
trust common law and not try to specify substantive norms legislatively. To be 
sure, there are needs for Congressional interventions on procedural and insti-
tutional issues-Hart-Scott-Rodino's success and the possibility of a statute 
giving the Antitrust Division preemptive powers are two such examples. But 
there is little reason to believe that Congress could do better than the federal 
courts in articulating substantive antitrust norms, for example mandating a 
discount-attribution test for bundled discounts (which I favor) or overruling 
Leegin (which I do not). 
This is not because antitrust law is not amenable to rules, but only to stan-
dards, or because the courts are particularly good at articulating antitrust 
norms. Many antitrust principles can and should be reduced to rule-like deter-
minants,103 and the courts have sometimes shown remarkable ineptitude at ar-
ticulating antitrust principles. Rather, a Neo-Chicagoan preference for courts 
over Congress would stem from a view that, in antitrust, incrementalism is 
generally preferable to drastic change and that the damage wrought by bad 
norms is generally less and more quickly undone when the perpetrator is a 
judge than a Member of Congress. The Robinson-Patman Act has remained 
on the books since 1936 even though it is highly doubtful that it could be 
101 See Crane, Intel, supra note 88. 
102 See, e.g., Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981). 
103 See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 49 (2007). 
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reenacted today. In the antitrust field, legislative inertia is stickier than stare 
decisis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If Neo-Chicago is a school, it is an elementary school waiting for develop-
ments in the Post-Chicago middle school next door. As Post-Chicago devel-
ops its arguments for more interventionist substantive liability norms, there 
will be greater need for Neo-Chicago scholarship in response. On the other 
hand, the institutional side of antitrust law is already fully ripe for Neo-Chi-
cago intervention. 
